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DISCUSSION 
ON THE CONCEIVABILITY OF MECHANISM* 
MICHAEL MARTIN 
Boston University 
In a recent paper Norman Malcolm has argued that mechanism is an inconceiv- 
able position.' By this Malcolm does not mean that mechanism is logically contra- 
dictory. Rather mechanism is a position which cannot be asserted or argued for. 
For, according to Malcolm, asserting a position and arguing for a position involve 
purposeful behavior and mechanism excludes all purposeful behavior. Thus 
mechanism may well be true, but ifit is true, then it cannot be asserted or argued for. 
The bulk of Malcolm's paper is an attempt to develop the thesis that mechanism 
excludes all purposeful behavior. This exclusion turns on another of Malcolm's 
theses, namely that a neurophysiological explanation and a purposeful explanation 
of the same bodily movements are impossible. If this latter thesis is shown to be 
false, Malcolm's argument for the inconceivability of mechanism collapses. 
Malcolm is quite aware of this and in his final paragraph he says: 
I must confess that I am not entirely convinced of the correctness of the position I have 
taken in respect of the crux of this paper-namely, the problem of whether it is possible 
for there to be both a complete neurophysiological explanation and also a complete pur- 
posive explanation of one and the same sequence of movements.... Perhaps the publica- 
tion of the present paper will be justified if it provides a truly convincing defense of the 
compatibility of the two forms of explanation ([1], p. 72). 
My paper perhaps will not provide a "truly convincing defense" of the com- 
patibility of the two forms of explanation Malcolm mentions. However, it will show 
that Malcolm's uneasiness about his own argument is quite justified. I will show 
that Malcolm has given no good reason to suppose that neurophysiological explana- 
tions and purposeful explanations are not compatible and thus that his thesis that 
mechanism is inconceivable is unwarranted. I will also show that in one important 
sense mechanistic explanations could be more basic than purposive explanations. 
1. Ambiguities in Malcolm's Definition of 'Mechanism'. As Malcolm initially 
introduces the concept of mechanism it refers to "A special application of physical 
determinism-namely to all organisms with neurological systems, including human 
beings" ([1], p. 45). This version of mechanism assumes a neurophysiological theory 
which is adequate to explain and predict all movements of human bodies except 
those caused by outside factors. The explanation provided by the theory would 
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state "sufficient conditions of movements and not merely necessary conditions" 
([1], pp. 45-46). Let us call his version of mechanism M1. 
It is important to realize that as Malcolm characterizes M1, M1 provides some 
sufficient neurological condition as well as some necessary neurological condition 
for any bodily movement that is not caused by outside factors. This characterization 
is perfectly compatible with: (a) some necessary condition of some bodily movement 
(which is not caused by outside factors) being non-neurological and (b) some 
sufficient condition of some bodily movement (which is not caused by outside 
factors) being non-neurological. These non-neurological necessary or sufficient con- 
ditions could be certain psychological states, e.g. purposes or beliefs. 
Later on in his paper Malcolm introduces-apparently without realizing it-a 
stronger notion of mechanism, one that is not entailed by M1. 
Let us remember that the postulated neurophysiological theory is comprehensive.... 
It is a closed system in the sense that it does not admit, as antecedent conditions, anything 
other than neurophysiological states or processes.... If the neurophysiological theory 
were true, then in no cases would desires, intentions, purposes be necessary conditions of 
any human movement ([1], p. 56). 
It is clear that in this passage Malcolm is at least suggesting that neurophysio- 
logical theory would provide some sufficient condition and some necessary con- 
dition for any bodily movement (not caused by outside factors) and moreover any 
necessary condition for any bodily movement would be a neurophysiological one. 
Let us call this version of mechanism M2. 
Malcolm does not distinguish M2 from another even stronger version of mecha- 
nism suggested in the above passage by the phrase "it does not admit as antecedent 
conditions anything other than neurophysiological states or processes." On this 
version neurophysiological theory provides some sufficient condition and some 
necessary condition for any bodily movement (not caused by outside factors) and 
excludes any necessary condition other than a neurophysio]ogical one for any 
bodily movement and excludes any sufficient condition other than a neurophysio- 
logical one for any bodily movement. Let us call this version of mechanism M3. 
It is important to realize that although M3 entails M2 and M2 entails M1, M1 
does not entail M2, and M1 does not entail M3, and M2 does not entail M3. Once 
these three progressively stronger varieties of mechanism are clearly distinguished 
much of the force of Malcolm's thesis is lost. 
2. The Argument for the Inconceivability of Mechanism. A neurophysiological 
explanation, according to Malcolm, would have the following form: 
(1) Whenever an organism 0 of structure S is in neurophysiological state q, 
0 will emit movement m, provided there are no countervailing factors. 
(2) Organism 0 of structure S was in neurophysiological state q. 
(3) There were no countervailing factors. 
(4) .:. Organism 0 emitted movement m. 
Premise (1) in the explanatory argument is, according to Malcolm, a contingent 
proposition that could be refuted by empirical evidence. (1) is to be contrasted with 
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some premises in purposive explanation. Purposive explanations have the following 
form: 
(1') Whenever an organism has goal G and believes that movement m is re- 
quired to bring about G, it will emit m provided there are no counter- 
vailing factors. 
(2') Organism 0 had G and believed m was required. 
(3') There were no countervailing factors. 
(4') Organism 0 emitted m. 
Now (1'), according to Malcolm, is not a contingent truth but an a priori principle; 
it is true because of the meaning of the terms 'goal' and 'believe.' Malcolm argues 
that because of the a priori nature of (1'), (1) cannot be more basic than (1'). Accord- 
ing to Malcolm (1) would be more basic than (1') only if (1') was dependent on (1). 
But since (1') is a priori true, it cannot be dependent on any contingent statement 
like (1). 
Malcolm points out, however: 
Someone might suppose that although purposive explanations cannot be dependent on 
nonpurposive explanations, they would be refuted by the verification of a comprehensive 
neurophysiological theory of behavior. I think this view is correct: but it is necessary to 
understand what it cannot mean. It cannot mean that the principles (the universal premises) 
of purposive explanations would be proved false.... Since the verification of a neuro- 
physiological theory could never disprove any purposive principles, the only possible 
outcome of such verification, logically speaking, would be to prove that the purposive 
principles have no application to the world ([1], p. 51). 
But to say that (1') has no application to the world would be to say that either 
(2') or (3') is false for any organism 0. Malcolm rejects the suggestion that (3') 
would be false in every case and concludes that if mechanism is true, (2') is false for 
any organism 0. But to say that (2') is false for any organism 0 is just to say that 
organisms do not ever have goals or beliefs about these goals. Thus mechanism 
excludes an organism asserting mechanism or arguing for mechanism since assert- 
ing and arguing presuppose goals and beliefs. 
The crucial question is why Malcolm supposes that the confirmation of mecha- 
nism would make alleged a priori principles like (1') not applicable to the world and 
thus make (2') false for any organism 0. It would seem that the only reason for 
supposing this to be true is that Malcolm is talking about mechanism M3. Neither 
mechanism M1 nor mechanism M2 would exclude some non-neurological sufficient 
condition for some bodily movement (not caused by outside factors) and thus the 
confirmation of M1 or of M2 would not entail that organisms do not have purposes 
and beliefs that were sufficient conditions for their behavior. In short, on M1 and 
M2, (1') could apply to the world and thus M1 and M2 could be asserted or 
argued for. 
The only passage I can find in which Malcolm tries to answer the sort of objection 
just raised is the following: 
It might be thought that there could be two different systems of causal explanations of 
human movements, a purposive system and a neurophysiological system. The antecedent 
conditions in the one system would be the desires and intentions of human beings; in the 
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other they would be the neurophysiological states and processes of those same human 
beings. Each system would provide adequate causal explanations of the same move- 
ments. 
Generally speaking, it is possible for there to be a plurality of simultaneous sufficient 
causal conditions of an event. But if we bear in mind the comprehensive aspect of the 
neurophysiological theory-that is, the fact that it provides sufficient causal conditions 
for all movements-we shall see that desires and intentions could not be causes of move- 
ments. It has often been noted that to say B causes C does not mean merely that whenever 
B occurs, C occurs. Causation also has subjunctive and counterfactual implications: if 
B were to occur, C would occur; and if B has not occurred C would not have occurred. But 
the neurophysiological theory would provide sufficient causal conditions for every human 
movement, and so there would be no cases at all in which a movement would not have 
occurred if the person had not this desire or intention. Since the counterfactual would be 
false in all cases, desires and intentions would not be causes of human movements. They 
would not ever be sufficient causal conditions nor would they ever be necessary causal 
conditions ([1], pp. 56-57). 
There are a number of problems with this passage. First, although it may be true 
that "B causes C" cannot be analyzed in terms of "Whenever B occurs, C occurs" 
and must be analyzed in terms of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals it 
does not follow that "B causes C" entails "If B had not occurred, C would not have 
occurred." Malcolm is apparently confusing here nomologically sufficient con- 
ditions and nomologically necessary conditions: "Jones' taking poison caused 
Jones' death" entails "If Jones would have taken poison, Jones would have died" 
but not "If Jones would not have taken poison, Jones would not have died" since 
Jones might have been shot at the same time as he was poisoned. 
Secondly, even if one assumes that causality involves both nomologically neces- 
sary and nomologically sufficient conditions, Malcolm's conclusion does not follow. 
If B is a necessary and sufficient condition for C, this does not mean that some 
distinct factor D could not be both necessary and sufficient for C. Thus the fact that 
neurophysiological factors are both necessary and sufficient for behavior does not 
mean that purposes and beliefs could not also be necessary and sufficient for the 
behavior. As we have seen, this possibility is allowed for in mechanism M1. 
Moreover, as we have seen, even if purposes and beliefs for behavior are ruled 
out as necessary conditions (as they are in mechanism M2) they might still be 
sufficient conditions for behavior. And only mechanism M3 seems to rule out this 
possibility. 
We must conclude that Malcolm has not shown that on mechanisms M1 and M2 
purposive explanations and neurophysiological explanations cannot be given of the 
same human behavior (where an explanation provides sufficient conditions) and 
thus he has not shown that mechanisms Ml and M2 are inconceivable. 
3. The Tenability of Mechanism M3. Thus far we have argued that at most Malcolm 
has shown that M3 is inconceivable. But has he shown this? To decide the issue we 
must distinguish between two different versions of M3. On the first version of M3 
all nomologically non-neurological sufficient conditions of human behavior (that is 
not caused by outside factors) are excluded. Nomologically sufficient conditions are 
specified by contingent law-like propositions. On this version of mechanism M3 all 
such contingent non-neurophysiological propositions which purport to explain 
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human behavior would be supposed to be either false or not applicable to the 
world, i.e. their antecedents would be false. Let us use 'M3a' to denote this version 
of mechanism M3. 
On the second version of M3, all sufficient conditions (nomological and logical) 
are excluded. By a logically sufficient condition I mean this: 
A is a logically sufficient condition for B if and only if A entails B. 
According to Malcolm 
(a) An organism 0 has goal G and believes that movement m is required to 
bring about G and there are no countervailing factors 
entails 
(b) Organism 0 emits movement m. 
Thus the goals and certain beliefs of an organism under certain conditions provide 
a logically sufficient condition for the organism emitting a certain movement. 
Indeed, it is because of this logically sufficient condition that (1') is supposed by 
Malcolm to be an a priori truth. 
Now on this version of M3 it is supposed that any logically sufficient condition 
for (b) that is not in neurophysiological terms is false. Put in a different way: any 
a priori true hypothetical proposition (not in neurophysiological terms) in which the 
consequent specifies that an organism emitted movement m would not apply to the 
world, i.e. the antecedent of the hypothetical would be false. Let us use 'M3b' to 
denote this version of mechanism M3. 
Now clearly Malcolm has not shown that M3a is inconceivable since all con- 
tingent non-neurophysiological law-like statements that purport to explain human 
behavior may be false. This would be perfectly compatible with the existence of 
purposes and beliefs and with allegedly a priori principles like (1') applying to the 
world. 
At best Malcolm's argument has shown that M3b is inconceivable. But what a 
strange position this is. Who has ever held it? For to advocate M3b would be to 
advocate that any proposition (even a proposition which is completely innocuous 
to mechanists) that entails (b) would be false. Consider, for example: 
(c) Organism 0 emitted movement m'. 
Now let us define movement m' as a movement immediately preceding movement 
m. Then (c) entails (b) and thus (c) is a logically sufficient condition for (b). There- 
fore: 
(1') Whenever an organism emits movement m', then the organism emits 
movement m. 
is a conceptual a priori truth analogous to (1') and by an argument analogous to 
Malcolm's (1") could never apply to the world. Therefore (c) would be false. This 
would mean that no movement of an organism is preceded by any other movement. 
It is far from obvious that any mechanist has ever embraced M3b. But even if 
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some mechanists have embraced M3b with its absurd implications they would not 
need to. Weaker and less objectionable versions are open to them, e.g. MI, M2, 
and M3a, 
Now it may be objected that (c), unlike (a), does not specify a cause of the move- 
ment of the organism. This suggests still another version of M3. On this version 
neurophysiological theory excludes all logically sufficient conditions for human be- 
havior which could specify causes of the behavior. Let us call this version of M3b, 
MMbl. Consider however: 
(d) Organism 0 receives external stimulus s. 
External stimulus s can be defined as a stimulus immediately preceding organism 0 
emitting movement m. 
Now (d) entails (b) and it is not unusual to speak of a certain external stimulus 
that precedes behavior as a cause of the behavior. For example one might say 
"Jones' walking into the room caused Smith to fidget" or "The fumes from the fire 
caused Jones to cough." Now: 
(1') Whenever an organism receives stimulus s then the organism emits move- 
ment m. 
would be an a priori truth. 
By an argument similar to Malcolm's (1") would not apply to the world. Thus (d) 
would be false. This would mean that organisms never receive stimuli immediately 
before they emit movements. As far as I know no mechanist has ever embraced a 
position with such absurd implications, and as we have seen there is no need for a 
mechanist to do so. 
Instead of embracing M3bl a mechanist would surely argue that if stimulus s is 
the cause of behavior B a neurophysiological explanation could be given of the 
causal relation; he would maintain that there is a neurological connection between 
the stimulus s and behavior B if s is the cause of B. It should be noted that neither 
the fact that (d) entails (b) nor the fact that (1"') is an a priori truth prevents him 
from doing this. 
This consideration also applies to purposes and beliefs. The fact that (a) entails 
(b) and the fact that (1') is an a priori truth does not prevent neurophysiology from 
specifying a neurophysiological connection between purposes and beliefs and the 
behavior which results from these purposes and beliefs. 
4. Mechanism and the Meaning of Terms. So far we have seen that a mechanist 
need not hold a position that entails that (1') does not apply to the world. Moreover, 
we have seen that one mechanistic position that seems to be implicit in Malcolm's 
paper would have such absurd consequences that no sane mechanist would em- 
brace it. 
Let us suppose, however, that some particular version of Mabl was formulated 
which would entail that (1') does not apply to the world but which would not have 
the kind of absurd implications specified above. Let us call this version of mecha- 
nism MMbl, M*bl. Would Malcolm be correct? Would mechanism M'*bl be in- 
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conceivable in the sense that if M~*bl were true, it could not be asserted or argued 
for ? 
Let us grant Malcolm's thesis that (IF) is true a priori. As Malcolm correctly notes 
the a priori nature of (1') could not be due to the form of the statement. Rather if 
(1') is true a priori, then it is because of the present meaning of the terms in it, in 
particular the meaning of terms like 'goal' and 'belief.' 
Now although Malcolm is correct that M*bl cannot be asserted or argued for 
given the present meaning of 'goal' and 'purpose,' it does not follow that M*bI 
could not be asserted given some other meaning of 'goal' and 'purpose.'2 If 'goal' 
and 'belief' meant something different in (1') from what they mean in (1'), then (1') 
might be found to be a false contingent statement. If it were, (2') need not be false 
and organisms could have goals and beliefs. Hence, Mtbl could be asserted. 
Indeed, it is not implausible to suppose that the confirmation of a comprehensive 
neurophysiological theory would bring about changes in the ordinary meaning of 
psychological terms like 'purpose' and 'belief.' These changes might make it pos- 
sible to assert M311 in the ordinary sense of assert, i.e. the sense of 'assert' that 
prevailed at that time in which the theory had gained great prominence. 
It is also important to realize that if changes in the meaning of certain psycho- 
logical terms were to occur due to the wide acceptance of M3*,, this would not 
necessarily bring about any changes in the denotation or reference of these terms. 
Change in meaning or sense is compatible with fixed reference. Thus although 
'purpose' and 'belief' might come to have different senses than they do now, they 
might still refer to some class of mental states, dispositions and the like. Thus one 
might assert Mtbl and in this activity be doing something that has always been 
called 'asserting,' i.e. the denotation of 'asserting' would be the same as it is now; 
the only thing that would have changed would be the meaning or sense of 'asserting.' 
Thus Mtbl is conceivable given certain changes in the meaning of our psycho- 
logical language which are compatible with invariance in the referent of such lan- 
guage. 
5. The Primacy of Neurophysiology. So far I have argued that Malcolm has not 
shown that several different versions of mechanism are inconceivable. Moreover, I 
have argued that there is implicit in Malcolm's paper another sense of 'mechanism' 
that is inconceivable but that this sense of mechanism has such absurd consequences 
that no sane mechanist could embrace it. Finally, I have argued that even if a 
definition of mechanism could be constructed which does not have these absurd 
consequences this purified version would still be conceivable given changes in the 
meaning of some of our psychological terms that are compatible with fixed refer- 
ences for these terms. 
I have throughout defended the compatibility of purposive explanations and 
neurophysiological explanations. One question that remains is in what sense a 
mechanist could maintain that although purposive explanations and neuro- 
2 See Peter Robinson, The Concept of Reduction in the Behaviorial Sciences, unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1969, for a similar point. 
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physiological explanations are compatible neurophysiological explanations are 
more basic than purposive explanations. 
It is clear that a mechanist could maintain that mechanistic explanations are 
more basic if the meaning of certain psychological terms changed. If the meaning 
of 'goal' and 'belief' changed, (1') could be a contingently true statement. The truth 
of (1') might be dependent on some neurophysiological state. For instance an 
organism which has a goal G and which has the belief that movement, m, is 
necessary to achieve G will not emit movement m unless the organism has struc- 
ture S and is in neurophysiological state q. In this sense neurophysiological explana- 
tions are more basic. This is in fact the sense of 'more basic' specified by Malcolm. 
Now Malcolm's sense of 'more basic' would not apply if (1') is an a priori truth 
for if (1) is an a priori truth, the truth of (1') could not be dependent on some neuro- 
physiological state. However, perhaps some other meaning of 'more basic' can be 
given which would apply. I believe a different and relevant sense of 'more basic' can 
be constructed. 
First of all it is important to note that nothing Malcolm says rules out the pos- 
sibility that goals and beliefs have neurophysiological sufficient conditions. Thus a 
law of the following form might well hold: 
(5) Whenever an organism with structure S is in neurophysiological state q, 
the organism has goal G and believes that movement m is necessary for 
achieving G provided there are no countervailing factors. 
(5) Combined with (2) and (3) would enable us to deduce 
(6) Organism 0 has goal G and believes that movement m is necessary for 
achieving G. 
Thus neurophysiology could explain all the movement which purposive explana- 
tions could and more. First, neurophysiological theory could explain the causes of 
purposive behavior that are postulated in purposive explanations, i.e. purposes and 
beliefs. Purposive explanations presumably could not explain this. Secondly, 
neurophysiological theory could explain nonpurposive behavior. By hypothesis 
purposive explanations could not explain this sort of behavior. 
But in one important sense a theory T1 is more basic than T2 if T1 can explain 
everything which T2 can explain and more, and T1 can explain the causes postulated 
by T2 in explaining what T2 can explain whereas T2 cannot explain these causes. In 
this sense of 'more basic' a mechanist might argue that neurophysiology is more 
basic than the commonsense principles or "theories" used in purposive explana- 
tions. It is important to realize this sense of 'more basic' is compatible with the 
allegedly a priori nature of the principles of purposive explanations. 
Now whether neurophysiological theory is (or will become) more basic in this 
sense I do not know. But it is clear that Malcolm has said nothing to show that it 
is not more basic or will not become so. 
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